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Abstract: 
Although research into childrens eyewitness testimony has become more and more refined findings do 
not translate smoothly into practice. While competing scientific approaches produce complex results, 
practice is haunted by polarised debates that divert attention away from child witnesses or even undermine 
their position. In this paper I argue that an overall lack of concern for the reciprocal relationships between 
juridical, psychological and public discourses is responsible for this dynamic, which is furthermore fuelled 
by the fact that the concept of suggestibility has always remained an ill-defined entity. To address this 
problem I will introduce a multidisciplinary research perspective that is aimed to add transparency to the 
field by analysing the counterproductive dynamics between theory and application on an international 
level. Child witness research and practice in Britain and Germany are examined as comparative case 
examples via in-depth interviews with academic, psychological and juridical professionals who work in the 
field.  
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Introduction: 
Over the past few decades research in the field of child witnessing has taken several huge steps 
forward, generally affirming childrens ability to give evidence in courts of law. At the same time 
there has been persistent wariness about the reliability of childrens testimony. Intense 
controversies around memory development, childrens suggestibility and the influence of 
different interview styles have continued to dominate both research and practice. In particular, 
the question of childrens suggestibility has sparked an immense research interest, resulting in a 
number of studies that have produced valuable insights into the possible developmental, 
circumstantial and personal factors underlying childrens propensity to succumb to suggestions. 
However, research in this field faces various problems. When the findings are subject to close 
scrutiny, it becomes clear that suggestibility research is riddled with what appear to be 
contradictory results. Furthermore, there are persistent difficulties in translating scientific findings 
about childrens testimony into juridical practice: Interviewers tend to veer from the 
recommended questioning procedures; courts seem unable to appreciate the full complexity of 
the balanced and rather tentative messages that psychiatric or psychological experts are 
promoting and the scientific community itself is frequently drawn into polarised and heated 
public debates about child witnesses credibility and suggestibility in the most unhelpful manner. 
Hence rather than creating a more circumspect framework for the evaluation of childrens 
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testimony, research itself becomes entangled in a contentious dynamic and thereby diverts 
attention away from the concrete child witnesses who should be at the centre of concern. So in a 
very real sense childrens testimony is suspended between theory and practice, neither of which 
seem to get to the heart of the problem. 
I would like to show that a productive way to depict and analyse this problem is to look at the 
field from the perspective suggestibility. Thus, in the following I would like to explore 
suggestibility --and respectively suggestion  (1) as a notion, (2) as an ambiguous theoretical concept, (3) 
as a contentious issue in experimental psychology, (4) as a focus of media reporting, (5) as a cause of juridical 
suspicion and (6) as backdrop of psychological expertise offered to courts. Hence I will explore the 
phenomenon of suggestibility from every possible angle, and thereby ignore disciplinary or 
conceptual boundaries in order to trace it all the way from its theoretical conceptualisation to its 
impact on practice. The research perspective I would like to introduce aims to empirically 
examine and use the tensions arising around the concept of suggestibility in order to add 
transparency to the whole field. This should facilitate a less polarised and more balanced debate, 
which will finally help to refocus on the concrete concerns of child witnesses. 
 
1. Suggestibility as a notion:  
Those scientists seen as the founding figures of psychology around 1900, , regarded both 
suggestibility and memory as central topics for the new discipline such as Wilhelm Wundt (1892) 
and Albert Binet (1900)e. Yet while memory research was soon established as a core issue for the 
science of the human mind, the interest in suggestibility waned quickly after an initial period of 
intense investigation. Yet, it is worth taking note of two early findings that are still remarkably 
relevant.  
Firstly, the French scientist Albert Binet (1900) who conducted a range of experiments around 
different forms of suggestion, voiced considerable doubts as to whether it was at all possible  or 
useful  to conceptualise general techniques of suggestion or to search for personality traits that 
would correlate with certain degrees of suggestibility. His central finding was that the degree of 
uncertainty experienced by a person in a specific situation and with regard to a certain issue in 
question, is directly linked to their susceptibility to suggestions relating to this particular issue.  
Secondly, the German scientist Wilhelm Stern (1904) pointed out that the notion of suggestion is 
incomplete. While we can name the activity of suggesting (to suggest) and the predisposition to 
succumb to suggestions (suggestibility) there is no term to denote the state of a person while 
under the influence of suggestion. On the basis of his own findings Stern introduces the 
differentiation active suggestion to denote the activity of suggesting, and passive suggestion to 
denote the psychological state of a person while under the influence of suggestion. Yet his most 
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important finding is that active and passive suggestion are entirely independent phenomena with 
no necessary causal connection. While they might well coincide, they are as likely to prevail on 
their own, hence the occurrence of active suggestion does not cause passive suggestion, and the 
existence of passive suggestion cannot be taken as a direct indicator for a preceding suggestive 
influence. 
Neither Sterns nor Binets findings had much influence on later research, which is unfortunate, 
as their considerations might have made a crucial contribution to modern research into childrens 
suggestibility1.  
2. Suggestibility as an ambiguous theoretical concept: 
Suggestibility was no longer pursued as a central and circumscribed topic after this initial period 
and the definitional problem remained unresolved. Regardless of this, suggestibility in the 
meantime lingered in psychological research as a sub-phenomenon linked to such diverse topics 
as: hypnosis, imitation, social contagion, conformity, compliance, decision making, imagination, 
changes in attitude, bias, expectancy, self-fulfilling prophecy, placebo, dissociation, coping and 
defence to name but a few. In fact this versatility and equivocality produces constellations in 
which the number of theoretical concepts seems to exceed the number of actually observable 
phenomena. Pavlov even considered that suggestion could be the simplest form of a conditioned 
reflex with the word being a universally applicable substitute for any other stimulus (Gheorghiu, 
1989 for a summary). Suggestibility only re-emerged as a circumscribed research topic in the late 
1970s, when due to societal changes in many northern American and European countries, a 
growing number of children were admitted as witnesses in courts (Bruck & Ceci 1999). 
Accordingly, modern suggestibility research resumed with a central focus on childrens 
suggestibility and testimony in applied forensic settings. 
3. Suggestibility as a contentious issue in experimental psychology 
One of the most frequently used definitions in modern suggestibility research is the one 
established by Ceci and Bruck (1993). They state that suggestibility is...  
 ...the degree to which childrens encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by 
a range of social and psychological factors. (Ceci, S. J., Bruck, M., 1993, p. 404). 
This is a useful, but rather functional definition that clearly points to the diversity and complexity 
of the factors that are to be considered. For example a strong memory trace for an event can 
prevent suggestive effects, and existing prior knowledge and help create a stronger and thus more 
robust memory trace (Ornstein, P. 2002). Yet ...knowledge can be a double edged sword 
(Ornstein, P. 2002, p. 38), as Ornstein notes with reference to a finding that existing script 
knowledge can also lead to omissions or false additions to a report. The same applies for stress, 
                                                
1 German research is an exception here, as it has always drawn extensively on the work of William Stern. 
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which has been shown to enhance, but also to impede encoding. Age is an equally ambivalent 
factor. While it was initially stated that susceptibility to suggestion decreases with age, Goodman 
(1991) was for example able to show that three to four year old children could be as resistant to 
suggestion as six to seven year old children. More recently Pool and Lindsay (2002) found that 
varying the interview script cannot just level out age differences, but can also reverse the trend in 
favour of younger children. Hence they conclude that... 
...processes that make testimony more accurate (...) and factors that make testimony less accurate (...) both 
increase with age. (Poole, S. A., Lindsay, D. S. 2002, p. 372). 
Considering more complex and contextual factors Ceci and Bruck (1995) for example identify 
strong sources suggestion in the questioning techniques used by biased interviewers: They tend to 
ignore inconsistencies, repeat specific and leading questions, encourage speculation and 
imagination, produce an accusatory or confirmatory atmosphere and induce stereotypes. These 
are valuable insights, yet critics have pointed out that suggestion may even occur in the absence 
of bias. 
Interviewers can inadvertently introduce ambiguity or bias into forensic conversations even when they do 
not have a strong agenda to collect evidence of abuse (Poole, D. A., Lindsay, D. S. 2002, p. 358). 
Additionally Pool and Lindsay highlight the possibility of a reverse dynamic. They found various 
ways in which the children might influence interviewers  by introducing ambiguous information 
into the conversation, because they fail to identify the topic or drift the topic without prior notice 
(Ibid., p. 358). So children can be as suggestive as they can be suggestible, and interviewers might 
succumb to these suggestions as well as they might inadvertently introduce suggestive elements 
just by asking neutral questions. Considering this reciprocity and the possibility of inadvertent 
suggestion, it becomes clear why it is important, but not entirely sufficient, to instruct 
interviewers to avoid suggestive questions: Interviewers can hardly be asked to avoid something 
they are not actually doing. 
4. Suggestibility as a focus of media reporting: 
Ceci (Ceci, S. J. et al 1994) conducted a study that investigated the impact of neutral but repetitive 
questioning by asking children, in ten consecutive interviews, whether or not they had 
experienced four specific events (two of these were fictitious events and two were events the 
children had in fact experienced). This study attracted huge public interest because not only did it 
show that in the final interview children would assent to have experienced 34% of the fictitious 
events. Additionally, 27% of these falsely assenting children persistently clung to their assent after 
the de-briefing and could not even be dissuaded by their parents. This unexpected additional 
outcome lead to the claim that quite possibly permanent false memories had been implanted by 
the repetitive questioning. 
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This study featured in the US-media and, among diverse reactions, it sparked a heated debate 
about the ethics of implanted memory research with children. One of the central issues raised by 
the critics was that ...this research violates childrens rights to create their own memory. 
(Herrman, D., Yoder, C., 1998, p. 204). Additionally the deceit that was revealed to the children 
in the debriefing procedure was seen as a threat to childrens development because it would 
...diminish appreciation of authority, decrease self-concept and (...) increase the sense of 
helplessness. (Ibid. p. 200). Ceci (1998) replied by denying that children could have been harmed 
and clarified that his experiment did not involve a deception (Ceci, S. J. 1998). However, a further 
contribution made to this debate by Goodman is interesting to my argument. She resolves the 
ethical dilemma by stating that quite probably no false memories had been implanted anyway. 
We still cannot say with certainty whether we successfully implanted false memories (...) because they may 
have assented to the questions for a variety of reasons, a false memory being only one of them. In sum it is 
possible that no false memories have been created in children in implanted-memory studies. (Goodman, 
G. et al. 1998, p. 210).  
She suggests that in fact children might well have continued to assent to fictitious events for a 
variety of reasons. 
...children may maintain that a false event occurred for reasons other than a false memory, such as to save 
face, to avoid the possibility of punishment, appear knowledgeable, or continue to play the game. (Ibid. p. 
211). 
According to Goodman two ethically far more concerning issues become apparent in this debate: 
Firstly results in false memory research have been overstated and have thus fuelled a dramatised 
and simplified public understanding of the actual phenomenon of false memories. And secondly 
the critics in this debate have gathered their information from third hand reference, thus 
promoting a distorted view of the false memory experiments.  
Herrman and Yoder are referring to a conference talk given by Ceci (1994) that was cited in the New York 
Times that was cited in an undergraduate textbook. (Ibid., p. 210). 
Finally she stresses that all of these unaccountabilities, irrespective of their well-intendedness or 
origin, will feed into the public with... 
...a chilling effect on (...) child sexual abuse investigations and prosecutions (e.g. those involving young 
children) by creating a general atmosphere of disbelief of childrens testimony. (Ibid., p.208). 
She finds this reflected in a decreasing number of reported abuse cases which could well be an 
effect of a recurring fear in children or parents to report abuse because nobody will believe them. 
Additionally she points to studies that suggest jury members will take the false memory debate as 
a clear sign of childrens unreliability as witnesses.  
This debate marks a crucial point in my cross-examination of suggestibility, because it 
demonstrates clearly how suggestibility transgresses disciplinary boundaries and pervades from 
theory into societal practices and opinions even on an international level, since Goodmans 
warning does not just apply for the United States. The dynamic depicted above proves 
paradigmatic and contagious for scientific and for courtroom practice in Europe as well. With a 
slight delay Britain has seen high profile cases around child abuse (e.g. involving allegations of 
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satanic-ritual abuse)2 that resemble those controversial cases in the US. The debate around 
implanted memory has also featured in the UK media with potentially similarly dubious effects 
on judges, police officers and jury members.3 Furthermore, despite the implementation of new 
guidelines that are designed to support and facilitate childrens testimony in court, decreasing 
prosecution and conviction rates for alleged cases of child abuse were reported in England over 
the past years, while there was little reason to assume that the prevalence of actual child sexual 
abuse had decreased at a similar rate (Kelly 2002).  
Striking parallels can also be observed in Germany, which is remarkable, because Germany has an 
inquisitorial legal system that differs hugely from the adversarial British and US-American system. 
Yet, in Germany media and science are strongly influenced by anglo-american debates and 
research literature. During the late 80s in Germany a heightened awareness for child abuse 
culminated in what has frequently been termed an abuse hysteria.4 As an effect of this the 
atmosphere reversed in the late 90s and turned into what can be called an abuse of abuse 
hysteria: Now a strong generalised scepticism against any abuse allegations prevailed.  
5. Suggestibility as prompt for juridical suspicion: 
During this time, and corroborated by US-American research literature, German authorities and 
scientists voiced intense concern that the legal system might be facing an epidemic of false 
allegations of sexual abuse in contentious custody cases. It was argued that a growing number of 
mothers were making accusations of sexual abuse, and even coaching their children into making 
accusations, in order to deprive their divorced partner from custody. I have worked in credibility 
assessment of child witnesses around this time in Germany and thus I can report from my own 
experience that this debate had a considerable effect on the way judges, police officers and 
psychologists approached these cases. This is even more disquieting when considering the results 
of a retrospective study of court files that was conducted in Berlin by Busse et al (2000), to 
establish the actual numbers of false- and true abuse allegations linked to divorce and custody 
cases in Germany. For this study a total number of 1500 court files (500 each from 1988, 1992 
and 1995) from Berlin family courts were subjected to an in-depth analysis to determine the 
numbers and the nature of abuse allegations in contentious custody cases. The results showed 
that between 1988 and 1995 there had been no increase of abuse allegations at all, in fact the total 
number of abuse allegations that were brought up during custody battles was generally rather low. 
Most importantly, the files analysed for this study did not contain any cases that featured a 
founded suspicion of deliberate false abuse allegations. Additionally a close review of the 
                                                
2 See for example the Broxtowe Case, Nottinghamshire, or the Shieldfield Case, Yorkshire. 
3 See for example Lee, N. M. (1999), Bell, S. (1988), Burman, E. (1997) for Britain. Ceci, S., Bruck, M. (1995); Ceci, 
S., Hembroke, H. (1998) for the United States. 
4 see for example Steller, M. (2000); Steller, M., Volbert, R. (1997). 
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relevant literature, that was conducted in the context of this study, revealed that some of the US 
studies, which had initially fuelled the debate in Germany, contained rather general or overstated 
results or had in fact been misinterpreted by the German readers.5 
6. Suggestibility as backdrop of psychological expertise: 
Considering these examples from Britain and Germany, it is obvious that Goodman makes a 
valid and internationally relevant point when she warns against the possible pragmatic 
repercussions of the implanted memory debate. Yet, her warning might not have the intended 
balancing effect because she  and most of the other contributors in this debate are always 
pragmatically reabsorbed into the adversarial dynamic of the legal context: Either they are 
reabsorbed personally when serving as experts in court, or indirectly when being quoted as 
scientific authority to support a certain claim or decision. Thus any statement in this debate may 
be challenged for being instrumental to promote a particular scientific approach. This is an 
abstract but also personal dilemma for those engaged in research and expert practice around child 
witnesses, as Ceci captures quite pointedly. 
What it [suggestibility research, J.M.] suggests is that the biases of researchers rather than the credibility of 
children should be investigated. (Ceci, S.J. et al 1993, p. 133). 
 
So, finally it seems that suggestibility is itself suggestive, and in this sense my exploration has 
apparently produced an even more complex picture of the problem. It seemingly ends in a 
deadlock rather than offering a solution. So why did I trace suggestibility all the way from Binets 
early considerations via modern experimental approaches to current legal debates in Germany? 
Was this to show that suggestibility research is doomed to failure? Was it an attempt to underline 
that this research is too complex to produce clear results or to instruct court practice in a 
predictable and productive manner? On the contrary; my rather brief exemplary sketch of 
modern suggestibility research was by no means intended as a methodological critique or a 
refutation of experimental approaches. By tracing suggestibility through time, disciplines, theory 
and practice I wanted to demonstrate that it is not only a complex but also a pervasive issue. 
Suggestibility transgresses scientific, pragmatic and personal levels of engagement and thereby 
causes reciprocal effects between the scientific and the applied context. In the light of this 
knowledge it now seems obvious that suggestibility will always evade the deliberate control of 
researchers and that it continuously betrays experts attempts to ensure the balanced application 
of their knowledge. And it does this, always at the cost of child witnesses. 
Yet, how could this problem be addressed? As there is no way to avoid or prevent the effects of 
this pervasiveness, I would argue that there is an urgent need to investigate these complex 
                                                
5 See McGleughlin, J. et al (1999) for a critical review of this debate in the United States. 
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repercussions in order to gain more transparency for the whole field and thus to facilitate a 
circumspect debate beyond accusation and polarisation. This is the aim of the research 
perspective I would like to introduce now. 
7. Investigating Complexity to create transparency: 
In a very real sense I would like to pick up Cecis suggestion to investigate researchers and 
interviewers, whereas my approach is not aimed at evaluating suggestive demeanour and bias or 
at exposing instances of bad practice. I would like to focus on researchers, interviewers and 
experts because they are operating at the pragmatic junction of the complexity that is so 
characteristic and crucial for issues around child witnesses and suggestibility. This complexity 
features, and can thus be explored, in the considerations, decisions and actions, of professionals 
pursuing the paradoxical task of mediating between disciplines, contexts and institutions on an 
every day basis. They have to found their own expertise on complex and ever changing scientific 
findings, while giving advise to  or respectively working within - a juridical system that does by 
principle not appreciate contradictions and ambiguity. And above all that they are expected to 
ensure that the well-being and wishes of the child involved in a concrete case are paramount. 
Hence I would like to explore this pragmatic complexity by conducting in-depth interviews with 
all those professions involved in creating, applying or dealing with knowledge about child 
witnesses and suggestibility: psychological and psychiatric experts (researchers and practitioners), 
juridical professionals (courts and police), social service professionals.6 This way I hope to gain a 
very complex and very concrete picture of the factors that create the conditions under which 
child witnesses give evidence. Furthermore, to illuminate the effects of different institutional and 
legal practices, interviews and observations are conducted in Britain and in Germany, to enable a 
systematic comparison of the position and current situation of child witnesses in these two 
countries.  
Presently the interviews are still in progress and I cannot offer any final results at this point, but 
to underline the nature and the aim of my approach I would like to give a brief example from the 
data collected so far.7  
An English police officer described an uncomfortable and significant experience he had during 
an investigation where the alleged victim was a learning disabled twelve year old girl, who lived in 
a care home. He got involved in the case because according to one member of the care staff the 
girl had reported being victim of sexual misconduct by another member of the care staff. The 
accused generally denied the allegations and in the course of repeated questioning the girl 
                                                
6 Additionally there will be observations of courtroom and assessment practice. 
7 Some details in this account were altered to guarantee anonymity while preserving the genuine and crucial aspects 
of the example. The authentic details are known to the author. 
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appeared unwilling to disclose any details about the alleged abuse to the police officer. As the 
initial report by the staff member appeared convincing, the police officer grew increasingly 
concerned he might not have conducted the interview with the girl in the correct manner. He 
thought he might not just have failed to facilitate a disclosure but even devalued any later 
statement she might give by having subjected her to repeated questioning already. The case was 
finally resolved by a lucky coincidence: An unrelated chance remark of another child who had 
seen that the person accused of sexual misconduct had accidentally hurt the girl with a food 
trolley. In the light of this information, it was possible to clarify with the girl beyond any doubt 
that this in fact was the incident she had initially complained about. Retrospectively, it became 
clear that, even though the reporting member of staff had not been entirely convinced about the 
accusation, she had after consulting her colleagues- decided to report to the police, rather than 
clarifying with the girl first. She had done this because she feared her clarifying questions might 
have suggestive effects on the girl, or she might at least be suspected of having suggested 
something to the girl by the police in the course of a possible investigation. The police officer for 
his part had been confronted with an abuse allegation reported by an experienced member of the 
care staff, which accordingly he felt obliged to take very seriously.  
This is a very brief and superficial sketch of a concrete and singular, but by no means unusual 
example. I cannot offer a detailed analysis here, so instead I would like to close by emphasising 
three salient aspects that come to mind in the light of the above example: 
Firstly, Binets claim that experienced uncertainty is a central factor for the occurrence of 
suggestive effects is relevant here. In this example the staff members collective uncertainty about 
the accusation produces (and thereby also exposes) uncertainty about their own professional 
position, as well as the adequacy and legitimacy of the actions that need to be taken. This 
uncertainty is partially resolved by passing it on to the police officer where it multiplies even 
further when he is left to wonder about his own professional conduct and expertise. Hence, as 
the basis of the professionals own expertise grows uncertain, all of the involved parties become 
increasingly prone to follow implicitly available suggestions and assumptions to resolve this 
uncertainty. To make this point very clearly: What I am saying is that even though none of the 
individuals involved here is acting unprofessionally at any point, or could be accused of showing 
a lack of consideration, the overall structural uncertainty produced by this type of case (child 
witness, allegations of sexual abuse, fear to suggest) destabilises their positions and makes it very 
difficult for them to decide what action should be taken. Secondly, and closely linked to the 
first aspect, Sterns differentiation of active and passive suggestion, and his claim that they need 
to be seen as independent phenomena is important: Suggestion in this example proves to be a 
rather diffuse dynamic. None of the involved persons can be accused of having caused the 
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suggestive influences to which staff members and the police officer succumb when following the 
hardening suspicion that an abuse must have happened. While the girl, who is in fact subjected to 
a form of suggestion when being interviewed repeatedly about the event in question, persistently 
clings to her sparse but accurate account.  
Thirdly, I would like to return to my initial claim that childrens concrete testimony is 
suspended between theory and practice: This example shows how the professionals are struggling 
to reconcile their own expert roles and their awareness of sexual abuse and suggestion, with the 
demands of the concrete case. As stated above, none of the involved are acting unprofessionally 
or hastily, but clearly, amidst the paradoxical obligation to reassure and legitimise the own 
actions, attention is diverted from the girl. Those dealing with the case are less and less able to 
focus on demands of the concrete situation: Finally the girl and her account end up being 
implicitly removed from the centre of attention, bearing little weight for the decisions taken 
during the investigation. In this sense I claim that her testimony was suspended between theories 
about abuse, suggestion and disclosure, and the ambiguous nature of the practical obligations and 
considerations of those who tried to help her. Luckily, and thanks to everybodys alertness, this 
particular case could be solved. Yet it is quite obvious that whatever the exact outcome of the 
ensuing polarisations and diversions might be in other, less fortunate cases, they are most likely 
to be at the cost of the involved children. 
I thus hope that my attempt to introduce an interdisciplinary approach that investigates the 
concrete complex interdependency of theory, research and practice via practitioners accounts, 
can add transparency to the whole field and de-polarise the debate. Finally, it might even help to 
add certainty to the positions of those dealing with child witnesses without taking an accusatory 
stance towards them, because it is quite clear that translating findings into practice is neither a 
simple matter of good instructions, nor is there such a thing as straightforwardly correct 
application. 
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